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ABSTRACT
The United States Army, unlike the other services, relies
heavily on its reserve components for reinforcing forces and
for augmentation in the support areas. There are currently
two heated debates taking place over the Guard and Reserves.
One debate is taking place within the Army. The other debate
is being heard on Capitol Hill as the Department of Defense
continues to request for reductions in the politically well-
connected Guard and Reserves. As the Army continues to draw
down its forces and faces demands for further reductions, the
number of Army reservists, as well as their roles and
missions, will become even more controversial. This thesis
begins with an examination of the intended role of the
reserves as established in the Total Force Policy adopted in
1973. The discussion continues with the performance of the
reserves during the Persian Gulf War, followed by an
assessment of the role of the reserves in the New National
Security Strategy. The congressional attitude towards the
reserves is addressed, including a discussion of how the Army
might meet the conditions of a hypothetical Base Force II
proposal and its impact on the reserves. Prior to the
conclusion, recommendations are offered for altering the
roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve the
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I . INTRODUCTION
On 2 August 1990, President Bush announced a major shift
in the structures and missions of the U.S. military in a
speech delivered at the Aspen Institute. The new national
security strategy, as it became known, was proposed in
response to dramatic changes throughout the world. As a
result of the end of the Cold War and diminished Soviet
(Russian/CIS) threat, the President's new national security
strategy calls for a shift in emphasis away from the Cold War
European conflict scenario and focuses on presence and world-
wide contingency operations.
Under the administration's proposal, the new strategy
calls for a 25 percent reduction in defense spending over
fiscal years 1991 to 1995. As part of the strategy, a Base
Force was proposed as the minimum force structure necessary
to meet U.S. national security needs. The Base Force called
for significant reductions in the active components (AC) and
the reserve components (RC). The Base Force calls for a
reduction in Army divisions from 18 active and ten reserve to
12 active, six reserve, and two cadre divisions.
When the United States finally arrives at the Base Force,
the RC will make up a significant portion of the Army's force
structure. As a result of the proposed reductions in the RC
,
there has been much discussion about the role of the reserves
in the new national security strategy. The number of
reserves has been a controversial topic between the
Department of Defense and the Congress. Additionally, the
performance of reservists during Operations Desert Shield and
Storm, in particular ground combat units, has added to this
controversy.
Some leaders in Congress and military analysts argue that,
given the end of the Cold War and diminished threats
throughout the world, the United States can once again rely
on a smaller regular force backed up by a large reserve
force. They support their argument by noting that reserves
provide an economical alternative to the high costs of
maintaining large active-duty forces. Some reserve
supporters have even made proposals to expand the role and
the missions of the reserves. On the other hand, the
administration appears to be rethinking how the reserves fit
into the Total Force Policy and the roles they will perform
in the new strategy.
Since the Army relies more heavily on its reserve forces
than the other services, this paper will focus primarily on
the Army's reserve forces and their role in the nation's
national security posture. 1 Table 1 shows Selected Reserve
contributions to the Total Force, by service.
1 Since the Army relies more heavily on its reserve forces than the
other services, this paper will focus primarily on Army reserve forces,
in particular the selected reserves. Selected reserve units are manned
by drilling members of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve and
supported by Full-Time support personnel. Hereafter the term "reserves'
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.
This paper will begin with an overview of the intended
role of the reserves as established in the Total Force Policy
adopted in 1973. The discussion will continue with the
performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War
followed by an examination of the new national military
strategy and how it affects the Army's RC . The congressional
attitude toward reserve forces will be addressed, followed by
an assessment of how the Army will meet the conditions of a
hypothetical Base Force II proposal and its impact on the
reserves. Prior to the conclusion, recommendations are
offered for altering the roles, missions, and structures of
the RC to improve the effectiveness of the total Army.
II. THE RESERVES AND THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY
Following the end of the Vietnam War and the abandonment
of the draft, the Army underwent a major transformation in
the composition of its forces. As the United States
transitioned from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force,
the reserves became the primary source for additional
manpower in time of military crisis or national emergency.
In 1973, the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted the "Total
Force Policy, " which reflected a heavy reliance on the RC . -
In a radical shift, the policy sought to integrate all
resources including civilian, host nation and the RC with the
AC. Under the policy, active and reserve forces were viewed
as a single fighting force. This integration sought to
achieve "The One Army Concept," in which the active forces
and RC were interwoven in all aspects of military training
and employment.-'' This chapter examines the factors which led
to the formation of the Total Force Policy and how the Army
implemented the policy, including a brief discussion of the
controversial Capstone and Roundout programs.
-Robert L. Goldich, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian
Gulf War," Congressional Research Service, 22 October 1991, p. 5.
3Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, "The Guard and Reserve: In
Pursuit of Full Integration, " The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force ,
ed. Bennie J. Wilson III, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, May 1985)
, p. 49.
There were several factors which led to the development of
the Total Force Policy. First, Americans have traditionally
been wary of a large standing Army and strongly believe that
the citizen-soldier, in a democracy, would bear the major
responsibility for providing defense in wartime. The fear of
a large standing Army and the establishment of a militia were
codified in the militia-related clauses of the United States
Constitution. As is the case throughout the Constitution, an
effort was made "...to prevent the accumulation of
overwhelming power in any person or agency." Congress has
the "...authority to organize, arm, and discipline the
militia; the states, the power to appoint officers and to
train the citizen soldiers." Congress was also given the
authority to "...summon the state militias into federal
service, for three specific tasks only: to execute the laws
of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel
invasion." The president was designated as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy and the militia when called into
federal service. Finally, the second amendment called for
"...a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security
of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed." 4 Military historian Russell F.
Weigley remarked, "...the Constitution ... retained the dual
military system bequeathed to the United States by its
history: a citizen soldiery enrolled in the state militias,
4John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard , (New
York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 49.
plus a professional Army" modelled after the British Army "or
more roughly, the Continental Army." 5
Second, as the United States began to draw down its forces
in the aftermath of Vietnam, the RC became a cost effective
alternative to maintaining a large and costly active Army.
As in the past, following a major war, the United States has
traditionally reverted back to a small active Army bolstered
by significant numbers of reservists. Additionally, the low
opinion of the military held by the American public,
following the Vietnam War, increased the pressure on Congress
to further reduce active forces.
Third, Congress remained committed to manning and
equipping the reserves. Congress strongly supported the
policy that the reserves should be trained and led by reserve
officers and noncommissioned officers. Fourth, the Total
Force Policy received the support of many senior Army
officers, including then Army Chief of Staff General
Creighton Abrams
.
Finally, many leaders in the Congress and throughout the
government, cited the fact throughout American history, when
reserve forces were mobilized and committed to battle, the
citizen-soldier performed admirably and with distinction. 6
As one military analyst stated, "It was the "citizen
^Russell F. Weigley as quoted by Robert L. Goldich, "Historical
Continuity in the US Military Reserve System," in The Guard and Reserve
in the Total Force , p. 15.
6These five factors have been summarized from Philbin and Gould,
p. 46.
soldier"- the National Guard and the Army Reserve not the
regular who fought America's wars and who was the traditional
"Savior of his Country." 7
One of the chief architects of the Total Force Policy was
General Abrams . Abrams, who served as the commander of U.S.
forces in Vietnam, experienced the negative impacts of the
Johnson administration's refusal to mobilize the reserves.
Abrams "...was determined to ensure that the mistake would
not be repeated." 8 Abrams decided to create a force structure
in which the reserves were an integral part. Abrams set out
to "...intertwine the three components [active, guard, and
reserve] so completely that to fight any war a President
would have to obtain congressional support and, in turn as
Clausewitz states, the will of the people." 9
Given a reliance on the reserves, the Army placed some
military capabilities needed only in wartime exclusively in
the RC such as water purification units, railroad units, and
heavy helicopter units. Additionally, a large proportion of
many capabilities in the areas of combat support (CS) and
combat service support (CSS) were placed in the reserve
structure. By the end of the 1980s, the size of the Army's
7Harry Summers as quoted by Charles E. Heller, The New Military
Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components . (Strategic Studies
Institute U.S. Army War College, 7 December 1991), p. 26.
8Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and Reserve Forces," American Defense
Annual 1991-1992 ed . Joseph Kruzel, (New York: Macmillan, 1992), p. 136.
^Charles E. Heller, The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the
Reserve Components
, p. 12.
RC surpassed the active force. Today, the Army National
Guard (ARNG) is responsible for a significant portion of the
Army's combat and CS capability, while the U.S. Army Reserve
(USAR) maintains much of the Army's CSS missions. These two
reserve components provide almost half of the Army's combat
structure and two-thirds of the Army's support structure (See

































Source: Department of the Army
Data as of September 30, 1 990
io TJU.S. General Accounting Office, "Peacetime Training Did Not
Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War, " Report to the
Secretary of the Army, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, September 1991), p. 8.
This restructuring changed the traditional role of the RC
from one of being "held in reserve" and providing augmentees
for active forces, to being an essential element in any
future conflict. General Abrams best reflected his intent
for fully integrating the reserves into the Total Force
Policy when he asserted, "They're not taking us to war again
without calling up the reserves." 11
A. CAPSTONE
In attempt to integrate the reserves with the active
forces, the Army implemented the Affiliation Program in 1973.
The intent of the Affiliation Program was "...to improve the
training and readiness of the RC combat arms units by
associating them with AC units." Affiliation was comprised
of two elements: Roundout and augmentation. Roundout brought
unders t rue tured active-duty divisions to standard
configurations. Augmentation "...assigned Guard and Reserve
combat arms battalions to fully structured AC divisions to
increase combat power." Affiliation was expanded in the late
1970s to include further integration of RC units into war
plans. This new program became known as the Capstone
Program. 12
1]
-General Creighton Abrams as quoted by Lewis Sorley in "National
Guard and Reserve Forces," p. 187.
12David E. Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and
Reserve Component Harmony
, (Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War
College, 11 February 1992), pp. 24-25.
The Affiliation Program, other readiness programs, RC
modernization, and wartime requirements were consolidated
under the Capstone Program. Capstone sought to define every
unit's wartime mission, both active and reserve. It attempted
to foster a closer working relationship between the RC and
the AC by having reserve units work with "...their wartime AC
headquarters on a regular basis to integrate planning,
training, and force modernization." Since its inception, the
Capstone Program has received much praise for improving the
readiness of the Total Army. 13 However, the failure to
activate some reserve units during Operation Desert Shield,
with Capstone missions for the Persian Gulf, generated
serious discussion about the Army's commitment to the
Capstone Program. 14
B . ROUNDOUT
One of the major innovative elements of the Total Force
Policy, which sought to further integrate the RC with the AC,
was the implementation of the roundout concept. The roundout
concept attempted to accomplish two major objectives. First,
roundout offered the Army a cost effective solution to
maintaining more active-duty divisions without increasing the
number of active Army soldiers. Under the roundout concept,
some divisions would have only two of their normal brigades




reserve brigade. Roundout was also used at the battalion
level
.
The second objective that the roundout concept sought to
accomplish was to upgrade the readiness and improve the image
of the Army RC . By assigning roundout units to active-duty
divisions, reserve proponents felt that the AC would be
forced to take a greater interest in the training and
equipping of the often neglected reserves. 15
Eventually, the roundout concept took hold and was
accepted as a crucial element in the Army implementation of
the Total Force Policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
as the number of Army divisions increased, the roundout
concept became a fact of life for many divisions. Prior to
the Persian Gulf War seven out of 18 Army divisions were
rounded out by a reserve brigade.
Since its inception, the roundout concept has probably
been the most controversial aspect of the Total Force Policy.
Some senior active Army officers and military analysts were
skeptical of the ability of roundout units, upon
mobilization, to deploy with or shortly after their active-
duty divisions. They were particularly concerned about those
roundout units assigned to divisions earmarked for rapid
deployment. However, most Army officials publicly endorsed
the roundout concept as it began to grow in the 1970s and
1980s. It was not until Operation Desert Shield that the
roundout concept faced its first true challenge. Operations
15Goldich, pp. 5-6.
11
Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought the roundup concept
back into the spotlight when two active Army divisions
deployed to the Persian Gulf without their roundout brigades.
12
III. RESERVE PERFORMANCE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR
As the United States continues to draw-down and
restructure its forces there will be much discussion on the
proper active/reserve structure to meet the nation's national
security needs in the post-Cold War era. The presidential
call-up of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War was the
greatest call-up and mobilization of the reserves since World
War II and marked the first real test of the Total Force
Policy. Many analysts will look at the Persian Gulf to make
their assessments about future structures and mixes of active
and reserve forces. This chapter examines the reserve
involvement in the war and argues that despite the public
praise for their performance, there remains a great deal of
concern amongst Army leaders about the ability of reserves to
perform certain missions as envisioned by the founders of the
Total Force Policy.
The first call up of reserve units took place on 22 August
1990 when the President called up 50,050 personnel to active-
duty in support of Operation Desert Shield. For this initial
call-up, the President exercised his authority to mobilize
the reserves under Title 10 USC 673 (b) which limits the
number of troops mobilized to 200,000 for 90 days. A 90 day
extension to this initial call-up was granted prior to the
second major call-up. As Operation Desert Shield transformed
13
into Desert Storm, the President issued an executive order on
18 January 1991, mobilizing up to 360,000 personnel under a
broader call-up authority (10 USC 673), which also permitted
the Army to call up members of the Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR) . The call-up process culminated in the mobilization of
about 213,000 reservists (includes all services) at the peak
of the war. 16
The Army called up more reservists than the other
services. The Army activated 1,033 reserve units, just short
of 150,000 personnel, and deployed 69 percent (708 units) of
the them to the Persian Gulf. These reserve units
represented all facets of the Army: combat, combat support,
and combat service support. They served in field artillery,
military police, maintenance, medical, engineer, petroleum,
as well as several other types of units. At one point, 25
percent of all Army personnel serving in Southwest Asia were
members of the RC
.
17
For the most part, the nearly 40,000 National Guardsmen
and 40,000 Army reservists, who deployed to the Persian Gulf
performed admirably and received high marks for their
contribution to the war. The performance of reservists in
the CS and CSS areas "...was often indistinguishable from
16U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Army Had
Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces" Report
to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March 1992), p. 9.
1 Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of




that of the active forces, in part a reflection of the
frequent congruence between what they did in civil life and
their military duties.
"
1& General Colin Powell, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee on 3 December 1990, commented:
The success of the Guard and Reserve participation
cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a




At the end of the war, General Powell referred to the
contributions of the reservists as "magnificent." The
Commander of the Army's Forces Command noted that the
performance of the reserves was "...one of the major success
stories of the entire operation." 20
As one might expect, virtually all of the administration's
and the Pentagon's comments on the participation of
reservists during the war were favorable. There is little
literature evidence which contradicts the claim that
reservists in the CS and CSS branches of the Army
successfully accomplished their missions during the Persian
Gulf War. Based on this favorable impression of reserve CS
and CSS units, the Total Force Policy premise of relying
18Sorley, p. 201
19National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard After Action Report:
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm 2 August 1990 - 28
February 1991 , June 1991, p. 5.
-°Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of





heavily on the RC for support missions during wartime was
validated during the Persian Gulf War.
A . ROUNDOUT PERFORMANCE
However, the performance of reservists, who were called up
but not deployed to the Persian Gulf, raised some serious
discussion about the assignment of reserve units to the
front line. The ground combat forces of the reserves
received a "black eye, " largely due to the performance of
three ARNG roundout brigades which were activated during the
conflict. Two active Army divisions were sent to the Persian
Gulf without their roundout brigades that were supposed to
deploy with them. The three roundout brigades received
unfavorable attention in the press as they spent a prolonged
period of time preparing for deployment to the Gulf. The
48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia ARNG (the roundout unit
for the 24th Infantry Division) was the only roundout brigade
certified as combat ready after spending a record two months
at the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, California. 21
As a result of the post-mobilization training performance of
the roundout brigades, several studies were conducted to
reevaluate the roundout concept as it fits into the Total
Force Policy.
- 1J. Paul Scicchitano, "Total Force or Total Failure," Army Times
15 April 1991, p. 11
.
16
The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a detailed
review of the three roundout brigades from December 1990 to
June 1991. The GAO concluded:
The Army has not adequately prepared its National Guard
roundout brigades to be fully ready to deploy quickly.
For example, many soldiers were not completely trained to
do their jobs; many noncommissioned officers were not
adequately trained in leadership skills; and gunnery
skills were less proficient than reported. 22
Several soldiers, approximately eight percent in two of
the brigades, had to attend formal schooling to learn a new
military occupational specialty. Despite having attended the
Army's Tactical Commanders Development Course, the entire
officer staffs of the three roundout brigades "...continued
to display tactical and technical weaknesses when they
returned to their units."— Maintenance problems plagued the
two roundout brigades at the National Training Center and
adversely affected training. Many mechanics and soldiers
"...did not know how to diagnose equipment problems or repair
the vehicles in a timely manner." 24 The GAO report also
concluded that the National Guard's different administrative
systems hampered the Guard's ability to transition to war.
Additionally, the GAO concluded inadequate peacetime medical
screening practices failed to identify a large number of
soldiers who were nondeployable for medical or dental reasons
22
"Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for
Gulf War, " p. 12.
23 Ibid., p. 18.
24 Ibid., p. 14.
17
under Army regulations. The GAO provided the Secretary of
the Army with recommendations for resolving these problems
including several suggestions for improving peacetime
training and training evaluations and combat readiness
validations .-
Another study on the roundout performance was conducted by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Many of the same
shortcomings that appeared in the GAO study appeared in the
CRS report. The CRS concluded that despite these
shortcomings, the roundout units proved capable of being
declared combat ready within three to four months after being
activated. The CRS added, "This is an unprecedented
achievement when compared to the previous historical
experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of
brigade or division size." 1 ' The report noted that several
factors led many to assume that roundout units were as combat
ready as similar active Army units: excessive optimism,
typified by a "can-do" attitude, inflated numerical readiness
levels, and "...high-level inattention to the actual
readiness levels of the roundout brigades." 17 Additionally,
the study notes that the active Army and National Guard "can-
:i " approach in public statements and in front of
congressional committees left the impression that "...the
roundout brigades would and could deploy with their parent




divisions under all circumstances, without any explicit
reference to the time that might elapse between mobilization
and deployment." 28
Reserve and National Guard supporters were infuriated by
the DOD's decision not to deploy the roundout brigades to
Southwest Asia. According to several analysts, the failure
to send the roundout brigades undermined one of the major
premises of the Total Force Policy. It was a devastating
blow to those ARNG roundout units who trained extensively,
developed a close relationship with their AC divisions, and
truly believed that they would be called to fight side by
side with active-duty soldiers in the event of war
.
J The
roundout decision also added to the traditional rivalry
between the "regulars" and the "citizen-soldiers." 30
The ARNG was critical of the post-mobilization training
program which was designed and implemented by active forces.
In the ARNG
' s Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action
Report , the Guard claimed, "The overwhelming support provided
the roundout brigades by the active component personnel had a
counterproductive affect on unit training." The Guard also
criticized the AC for "changing the rules" concerning




deployability criteria and for implementing a new combat
readiness evaluation process. 31
The DOD contends that the roundout brigades were never
intended to be deployed as part of an immediate response as
part of a short-notice rapid contingency mission. Instead,
it was envisioned that the roundout units would undergo post-
mobilization training and would enter the conflict as
"...part of early reinforcing forces (forces that would
depart for a crisis between 30 and 90 days after its
commencement)."'' However, many people, including members of
Congress, were led to believe that the roundout brigades
"...could deploy without at least several weeks of post-
mobilization training" and "...were as available for short-
notice, rapid response contingencies as for any other." 33
Several influential Congressman were outraged and voiced
their displeasure with the decision not to send the roundout
brigades. Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS), a
staunch advocate of reserve forces and a retired major
general of the Mississippi National Guard, often recited
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's comments about roundout units
while he served as the commander of the 24th Infantry
Division in the mid 1980s:
-jlArmy National Guard After Action Report , pp. 11-12.
jJ
"Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for




The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the
third brigade of my division. . . .1 expect them to fight
alongside us. They have demonstrated [their capability]
through three demanding rotations a the National Training
Center ... they are, in fact, combat ready. 34
During Operation Desert Shield, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)
,
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and
Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, urged Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
to integrate reserve combat forces as early as possible. The
DOD cited four reasons for not activating the roundout
brigades until four months after their parent units were
alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia. First, with the
possibility of immediate combat upon arrival, active forces
were better suited to meet the primary mission of Desert
Shield to deter and defend against an Iraqi attack against
Saudi Arabia. Second, General Schwarzkopf requested two
full-strength heavy divisions at the beginning of Desert
Shield. Since there was no time for roundout post-
mobilization training, two active brigades were substituted
for the roundout units. Third, General Schwarzkopf's request
was received 16 days prior to the initial call-up on 22
August 1990. Fourth, it was felt the initial call-up
restricted the effective usage of the reserves to 180 days
(90 days initially, followed by a 90 day extension based on
presidential discretion) .' Whatever the rationale for not
J4General H. Norman Schwarzkopf as quoted by Sorley, p. 196
35Goldich, pp. 9-10.
21
calling-up the roundout units, the DOD ' s decision sent a
powerful message to Congress concerning the military's true
attitude about the combat role of the reserves "...and the
validity of the entire Total Force study effort." 36
In light of the roundout performance, several military
officials including General Schwarzkopf agreed with Secretary
Cheney's and General Powell's claim that ARNG ground combat
units would require several months of training following
mobilization before being sent into combat. 37 In testimony
before congressional committees in June 1991, General
Schwarzkopf, recommended that roundout brigades should not be




B . APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED
In September 1991, the Army applied some of the lessons
learned from the Persian Gulf War and announced some
controversial changes in the roundout concept and the way
reserve units train. The Army acknowledged the shortcomings
of the roundout concept when it altered the mission of two
ARNG mechanized infantry brigades, earmarked for quick
response contingency operations, from roundout to roundup.
Sorley, p. 193
> 7 Pat Towell, "Schwarzkopf Points Out Flaws in Wartime
Intelligence," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , 15 June 1991,
p. 1603 .
3sCongress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of





In two Active divisions, the Army substituted the ARNG units
with an active-duty brigade and made the Guard units the
fourth ground maneuver brigade (hence the name roundup) for
their associated division. 39 Although the Army's Chief of
Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, has repeatedly acknowledged
that "roundout brigades are here to stay," the roundup
proposal came as a shock to reserve proponents and generated
more discussion on the utility of the roundout concept.
In another major overhaul of the reserve system, the Army
initiated a new approach to the way reserves train. In a
speech before the National Guard Association of the United
States, General Sullivan outlined that reserve units would
focus their training in peacetime on basic soldier skills at
the crew, squad, and platoon levels as opposed to larger
maneuver units. General Sullivan added that, "Full-scale
company, battalion, and brigade operations will be the focus
during post -mobilizat ion training." 40 The new approach,
dubbed "Operation Bold Shift", certainly added to reserve
supporters fears that the RC
:
...under the new national strategy is still shy of the
original intent of Total Force Policy planners ... The
missions [for the reserves] are in keeping with the roles
the Total Force Policy sought to change. 41
39Tom Donnelly, "Sullivan putting new spin on roundout brigades,"
Army Times , 16 September 1991, p. 10.
4(lChief of Staff U.S. Army General Gordon Sullivan as quoted by Tom
Donnelly in, "Sullivan putting new spin on roundout brigades," p. 10.
41 Heller, p. 21.
23
On 12 March 1992, General Sullivan announced another
controversial shift for the reserves. Referring to the
amount of time it would take to prepare reserve combat units
for war, Sullivan commented, "As a result of our experience
in Desert Storm, in my view it will take 90 days to do a
brigade .. .and about a year to train a division." 42 This is a
radical departure from the approximate 45 days of training
(for a brigade) previously envisioned by Army planners. This
announcement drew a great deal of criticism from National
Guard supporters who claim that ARNG units could be combat
ready in half the time.
C . SUMMARY
During the Persian Gulf War, the Army called up over
140,000 reservists and deployed over 74,0000 to the Gulf.
This mobilization marked the first true test of the Total
Force Policy adopted in 1973. During the initial phases of
Operation Desert Shield, reserve support forces were called-
up to assist in a monumental logistics effort. In the
beginning, it looked as if the Army would implement the
Capstone and Roundout programs of the Total Force Policy.
However, the failure to call-up several Capstone units and
the hesitation to activate roundout units caused many reserve
supporters and congressional officials to question the DOD ' s
4jGeneral Gordon Sullivan as quoted by Susanne M. Schafer, "Reserve
combat brigade's training may be extended," The Monterey Herald , 13
March 1992, p. 3
.
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genuine adherence to the principles of the Total Force
Policy
.
Army reserve units performing CS and CSS missions were
critical to the success of Operations Desert Shield and
Storm. According to many senior Army commanders, they could
not have succeeded without the reserve participation in these
areas. However, despite literature evidence and public
announcements which praised the performance of the reserves
during the war, recent Army reserve initiatives suggest
otherwise. The shift from roundout to roundup, "Operation
Bold Shift," and General Sullivan's 90 day announcement
indicate that the Army's leadership was not totally satisfied
with several aspects of the integration of the reserves
during the Persian Gulf War. These recent changes to the
approach for preparing reserve forces for combat, has added
more controversy to the debate of the role of the reserves in




IV. THE RESERVES AND THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
President Bush's new national security strategy contains a
Base Force consisting of 20 Army divisions. By 1995, the
Army's contribution to Pacific Forces will be two active
divisions, one light division in Hawaii and one heavy
division in Korea that will have a roundout brigade. The
Atlantic Force will contain two active heavy divisions in
Germany. The Contingency Force, located in the United
States, will be made up of five active divisions, three light
and two heavy. Finally there will be 11 divisions in the
continental U.S. -based reinforcement forces. . The breakdown
for these divisions is as follows: three active heavy
divisions with reserve roundout brigades, five heavy reserve
divisions, one light reserve division, and two cadre
divisions (See Table 3). The Army groups these 20 divisions
under three of the four pillars of the new national security
strategy: forward presence, crisis response, and
reconstitution. 43
>J LTG J.H. Binford Peay III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and
Plans, and COL Jack A. LeCuyer, Chief, Army Initiatives Group, "Gearing
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A
. FORWARD PRESENCE
According to the Pentagon's Base Force proposal, in that
portion constituting forward deployed divisions, the ratio of
active to reserve forces will remain essentially unchanged.
The four combat divisions, deployed overseas, will remain in
the active component, with the exception of the 2nd Infantry
Division in Korea which will have a roundout brigade. Under
this structure, the reserves will make up about eight percent
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of the CS and CSS roles. 44 Given the locations and missions
of the units performing the forward presence role, this AC/RC
mix makes sense. Additionally, there is some discussion of
reducing or scaling back the number of divisions deployed
overseas, particularly in Germany.
In addition to reducing forces by 25 percent and
decreasing the number of soldiers stationed overseas, the new
U.S. security strategy seeks to respond quickly to a wide
range of world-wide contingency operations. The Army
includes the five divisions earmarked for the Contingency
Force under the forward presence pillar. These CONUS based
divisions are classified as rapidly deployable and are
capable of being fully deployed in two to four months. The
above- the-line (divisional forces) force in the rapidly
deployable category will be 100 percent active-duty forces
and the AC below-the-line CS and CSS drops to 78 percent and
the RC to 22 percent. 4 " Pentagon officials contend that the
majority of reserve forces are not suited for the quick
response contingency type operation envisioned for the
future
.
The minimal reserve contribution in the Contingency Force
has raised the most concerns amongst reserve proponents about
the role of the reserves in the new strategy. The DOD ' s
reasoning for the the minimal participation of the reserves
in the Contingency Force can be found in the conclusions of
44 lbid, p. 156
45 lbid.
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Department of Defense's, "Total Force Policy Report to
Congress," issued in December 1990. The report concluded
that "...active duty forces should be able to deploy quickly
to future trouble spots and sustain themselves for the first
30 days with virtually no support from reservists." 46 The
DOD ' s claim that reserves will play less of a role for quick
response contingency operations has met strong opposition
from reserve supporters in the military and in Congress.
One military analyst, who favors an increase in reserve
involvement in the new strategy, asserts that the Army is
steering away from the Total Force Policy's original claim of
deploying the reserves early "...without qualifying the type
of contingency." He also adds, "...that part of the new
strategy which reduces the role in contingency operations may
have little chance of being accepted by Congress or the
American public." 47
B . CRISIS RESPONSE
The nine divisions designated to support the crisis
response pillar of the new strategy are predominantly made up
of reserve divisions. The 1995 breakdown for these divisions
will be three active heavy divisions with roundout brigades,
five heavy reserve divisions, and one light reserve division.
Additionally two roundup brigades have been placed in the
46Rick Maze, "Reserve study called 'political brochure," Army Times
17 June 1991, p. 6.
47 Heller, p. 21.
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crisis response category. The Army categorizes these crisis
response divisions as reinforcing and capable of being fully
deployed in six to nine months. Based on the announcement
made by General Sullivan, this deployability time will likely
increase to one year for the reserve divisions.
The reinforcement mission for the reserve forces under the
crisis response pillar appears to be a return to the
traditional mission of being held in reserve. The above-the-
line (divisional forces) force in the crisis response role
will be 22 percent active-duty forces and 78 reserve. The
three active divisions with the roundout brigades will have a
below-the-line CS and CSS ratio of 50 percent active and 50
percent reserve. The remaining six reserve divisions will
have only four percent active forces and 96 percent reserve
forces performing the CS and CSS missions. 48
The Army's shifting of reserve forces, particular the
reserve combat forces, away from the forward presence mission
and into the crisis response mission has generated a great
deal of concern in the National Guard. The ARNG has fought
long and hard to convince military and political leaders that
Guard units are reliable, competent, and capable of being
deployed with minimum post-mobilization training. The ARNG
sees this shift as a trend toward diminishing and eliminating
some of the Guard's roles and missions. While the discussion
over the new strategy continues, force structures continue to
be debated, and budget resources decline, the ARNG might find
4B Peay and LeCuyer, p. 156.
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itself under further attack by the Army's active leadership.
Faced with such an assault, the ARNG will likely resort to
its close political relationship with the Congress to
preserve as many of its units as possible.
C. RECONSTITUTION AND CADRE DIVISIONS
Another aspect of President Bush's new strategy which has
drawn much attention is reconst i tut ion . In theory,
reconst itut ion assumes at least a two year warning of a
military resurgence of the former Soviet Union based on the
old Cold War European based scenario. Reconstitution also
assumes that during the two year build up, the United States
will be able to generate new forces. In an effort to reduce
costs, the Army proposed the establishment of two peacetime
cadre divisions as part of the reconstitution portion of the
new strategy.
The cadre divisions would be partially equipped and manned
during peacetime then filled and trained in the event of a
major war. However, the Army has yet to announce how much
equipment and how many personnel will make up the cadre
division. Additionally, the decision as to what Army
component will be responsible for its implementation has yet
to be determined. The Army's uncertainty over these issues
has added further controversy to the cadre concept which has
drawn considerable fire from a number of sources.
The GAO, at the request of Representative Beverly Byron,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation, House Committee on Armed Services, examined how
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other countries organize and train their army reserves in an
effort to assist U.S. Army planners as they restructure its
components. 49 The GAO recommended that the Army test the
cadre concept ac various organization levels before fully
implementing the cadre divisions in the total force
structure. The GAO also recommended that the Army look at
other options to cadre divisions and other countries'
techniques for assigning and training reserves. 50
The cadre concept recently "took a turn for the worse"
after Representative Aspin announced his proposal for further
reductions in the military force structure. In addition to
eliminating an additional 200,000 active duty jobs by 1997,
Aspin ' s proposal calls for a new Base Force without the cadre
divisions. 51 Based on Aspin 's proposal and abandonment of the
cadre concept, there appears to be little hope that the cadre
divisions will become reality. Besides, it appears that the
Army will focus its attention on saving active-duty divisions
and let the proposed cadre divisions die stillborn.
49U.S. General Accounting Office, "Army Reserve Forces: Applying
Features of Other Countries' Reserves Could Provide Benefits," Report to
the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), p. 2.
50 Ibid., p.
3
-' 1 Rick Maze, "Congress whacks away at force plan," Army Times , 9
March 1992, p. 4.
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V . THE RESERVES AND CONGRESS
The final decision as to what role reserves will play in
the new national security strategy rests in the Congress.
Ultimately, it will be the Congress who determines how many
reservists will be on the payrolls. As mentioned earlier,
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the
authority "to raise and support armies" and "to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia." In 1989
and 1990 Congress asserted this authority and refused to let
the DOD eliminate any reserves. 52
During last year's budget battle, the Bush administration
proposed significant personnel cutbacks in the ARNG and the
USAR . The administration argued for cutbacks in the reserves
which were numerically comparable to the reduction in active-
duty forces. In the absence of a detailed analysis for the
proposed cuts and driven by the desire to protect the
interests of constituents, Congress rejected the President's
attempt to slash the reserves.
This chapter argues that congressional parochialism
motivates members to vote against the proposals for large
reductions in the reserves. While the administration remains
committed to reducing the reserves and the Congress persists
- zGreg Seigle, "Total Force tug of war," Army Times , 6 April 1992
p. 3.
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in maintaining a large reserve structure, it appears that
this subject will continue to be a contentious issue in the
future. Additionally, despite the congressional "battle cry"
for a peace dividend, the reserve issue demonstrates that
pork-driven activism in Congress will continue to have a
significant impact on the defense budget process as well as
military force levels in the future.
Many political scientists contend that members of Congress
tend to make their decisions on issues based on what will
provide the most political benefits to constituents. Barry
Blechman argues that members of Congress are motivated by the
desire to provide "pork" for their constituents and tend to
ignore the policy aspect of issues.-' 3 On the other hand,
James Lindsay claims that members of Congress do care about
the issues surrounding nuclear and conventional weapons
programs
.
Concerning nuclear weapons policy, Lindsay argues,
"Contrary to much of the literature on Congress, members care
about the substance of policy and not just where the benefits
go." Referring to conventional weapons programs, Lindsay
asserts that contrary to popular belief "...available
evidence and common sense both suggest ... that the parochial
imperative plays at best a subsidiary role." However,
- J Paul N. Stockton, "The Congressional Response," in Reconstituting
National Defense: The New National Security Strategy , Naval Postgraduate
School Document NPS-NS-9 1-0 12 , 30 September 1991, p. 88.
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Lindsay contends that "...the parochial imperative clearly
motivates congressional behavior on military base issues." 54
Many of the issues surrounding military bases are similar
to the issues involving the reduction of reserve forces with
one major exception. The reserve issue is much broader in
scope. Reserve units, armories, and centers are scattered
throughout the United States and have economic and political
implications in a far greater number of congressional
districts. The reserve issue, like the military bases
dispute, are two examples of the rare instances in which
Congress, as an institution, acts parochially.
This chapter will begin with an examination of the
administration's 1991 proposal and its rationale behind the
reduction. Following the discussion of the administration's
stance, the congressional response to the proposal will be
reviewed and explanations will be offered as to why Congress
acted the way they did. Prior to the conclusion, the current
battle being waged over the reserves in this year's budget
debate is addressed.
A. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
As part of the Bush administration's plan to reduce the
military by 25 percent during the next five years, the
President recommended a reduction of 107,526 reservists in
his fiscal year 1992 budget proposal. These cuts were





proportionately almost twice as much as the proposed
reduction in the active-duty forces. However, the Pentagon
argued that the AC and the RC would be reduced by equal
proportions over the five year drawdown cycle. 55 After much
debate, the administration suffered a frustrating defeat as
the Congress approved only about one-third of the
administration's request. In the end, Congress agreed to cut
the reserves by slightly more than 40,000 members. 56
During several appearances and testimony before Congress,
Secretary Cheney and General Powell failed to convince
congressional leaders of their plan to trim the reserves.
The administration rationalized the reserve cuts by focusing
on the costs of maintaining a "bloated" reserve structure and
the diminished role of reserve forces under President Bush's
new national security strategy. Additionally, the
performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War
raised some serious questions about the role of the reserves
in ground combat operations.
In 1990, Congress directed the Department of Defense to
study the Total Force Policy, AC/RC force mix, and military
force structure. On 31 December 1990, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense issued the "Total Force Policy Report to
the Congress . " The report recommended that the RC and the AC
should be reduced by about the same percentage. The Total
d5>Janet Hook, "Congress Finds Plenty to Do as War Fades Into
Memory," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , 10 August 1991, p. 2247
56 Pat Towel 1, "New Wars and Cold War Reflected in Budget,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . 14 December 1991, p. 3646.
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Force Policy Group also rejected the idea that certain AC
missions and force structure could be transferred into the RC
and still meet national security requirements. The
administration attempted to use these recommendations and
conclusions to justify their cuts in the reserve structure."
As the Persian Gulf War ended, the Department of Defense
faced an uphill fight in 1991 to rationalize its programs in
an era of decreasing military expenditures. As the Soviet
Union collapsed, the Pentagon found itself under further
siege to reduce defense expenditures. As the year
progressed, the issue of reserve reductions became even more
controversial. The administration claimed that the failure
of the Congress to cut the reserves threatened the combat
readiness of the active-duty forces. 58 Secretary Cheney
claimed that without equitable reductions in the RC, the Army
would have to assimilate approximately $11 billion dollars in
unnecessary expenses over the next six years. 5 -'
Echoing Secretary Cheney's remarks, General Powell told
the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense in
September 1991:
57Rick Maze, "Reserve study called 'political brochure," p. 6.
58Rick Maze, "Pentagon: Reserves drain dollars," Army Times , 30
September 1991, p. 8.
:' 9Eric Schmitt, "Focus of Clash on Military Budget Is How to Reduce
Reserve Forces," New York Times , 26 May 1991, p. 28.
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Look, I am second to no one in my love and respect and
admiration of reserves. We couldn't do anything without
them... I love them all, but I just don't need them all. 60
Frustrated by the congressional attitude not to reduce the
reserves, General Powell pleaded, "If you force us to keep
this unneeded structure in the reserves, you're just wasting
the taxpayer's money."- 1 Throughout 1991, Secretary Cheney
and General Powell criticized Congress for protecting
National Guard units and armories in their districts from
proposed Pentagon reductions. 62
Secretary Cheney and General Powell stressed to
congressional leaders that the reserve reductions were
directly related to the drawdown in the active forces.
Secretary Cheney argued that since the reserve structure is
there to support the active forces, if reserve units are not
eliminated in proportion to active units, "I'll end up with
Guard and Reserve units that don't have a mission." 63 General
Powell summed up his comments about keeping unnecessary
reserve forces when he asserted, "They'll train. We'll keep
3 °Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, as
quoted by Greg Seigle in "Reserve cuts hit raw nerve in Congress," Army
Times , 6 January 1992, p. 32.
61 Ibid.
62Eric Schmitt, "New Battle Ahead for Powell: Budget in Congress,"
The New York Times . 17 January 1992, p. A-ll.
^Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, as quoted by William Matthews
in "Cheney: Some reservists won't have a mission," Army Times , 19 August
1991, p. 6.
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them busy, but they'll have no mission.
"
b4 Congress was not
convinced by the administration's argument and agreed to
eliminate only a fraction of the administration's proposal.
B . CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
In 1991, Congress sent a double message to the Pentagon
when it agreed to cut active-duty forces by a third while
refusing to trim the reserves proportionally. 65 Frustrated
by the congressional response, Pentagon officials found it
extremely difficult to explain Congress' decision. On one
hand, many members of Congress demanded reduced military
spending, yet on the other hand they rejected the DOD ' s
proposal for reserve reductions.
In the book, Congress and Nuclear Weapons , James Lindsay
argues that congressional decisionmaking can be explained by
viewing the process through three "conceptual lenses":
deferential, parochial, and policy. The deferential lens
predicts that members of Congress will defer to the
President on weapons acquisition issues. The parochial lens
asserts that members evaluate weapons systems based on what
is good for their constituents and pay little attention to
what is good for the national interest. The policy lens
contends that members do care about the issues surrounding
b4General Colin Powell as quoted by Greg Seigle in, "Reserve cuts
hit raw nerve in Congress," p. 32.
65Seigle, "Reserve cuts hit raw nerve in Congress," p. 32.
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weapons programs and are genuinely concerned about how weapon
systems protect the national interests. 66
Although Lindsay's work primarily focuses on nuclear
weapons programs, he does apply the "conceptual lenses"
approach to conventional weapons and military bases. The
debate over cutting reserves closely resembles the debate
which took place over base closures in the late 1980s.
Lindsay argues, "...the parochial lens appears to best
explain how Congress handles DOD ' s requests on military
bases." 67 The reserve issue will be examined through the
parochial lens
.
According to Lindsay "...while individual legislators
often act parochially, Congress as an institution usually
does not."- 8 The reserve issue is one of the rare instances
in which Congress, as an institution acts parochially.
Unlike most weapons systems and defense programs, which
affect only certain areas of the country, the reserve issue
affects a much broader spectrum. Reserves train in over
5,000 armories and reserve centers located across the
country. Although some of these centers are colocated on
large military installations, the majority of the armories
bbLindsay, p. 7.
67 Ibid., p. 133.
6e Ibid., p. 131.
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and reserve centers are located in more than 3,000 separate
communities throughout the United States. 69
Although most members of Congress agree that some cuts in
the reserves are necessary because of the significant
reductions in the active forces, many are concerned about the
rapid draw-down in the reserves and the impact in their
districts and states. Representative Montgomery , a senior
member of the House Armed Services Committee, reminded his
colleagues of the economic impact those 3,000 armories have
in those communities: "...an armory in a small community of
100 guardsman, men and women, brings in about $1 million
payroll a year. Certainly we should not be closing these
armories." 7 ' Representative Dean Gallo (D-NJ) noted that the
administration's proposal would eliminate one in every three
reservists and the closing of one in every three armories
across the country. 71
One of the factors which impacted last year's
congressional decision to protect the reserves was that
"Congress historically has been reluctant to cut reserve
strength in the face of strong lobbying from the politically
"^Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year
1990 . (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1991),
p. 124.
^Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Congressional Record , 13
November 1991, p. H10388.




active National Guard members and Reservists." 7 - The ARNG and
the USAR have powerful lobbying forces in Washington that
wield substantial political clout. 73
The politically powerful National Guard Association of the
United States joined the fight to oppose Defense Department
reserve cuts. In April 1991, the National Guard Association
sent an "Action Gram" to the Adjutants General of all the
states requesting action in opposing the cuts in the Guard.
The "Action Gram" urged all guardsmen "...to convince each
member of Congress that the National Guard is the most cost-
effective portion of our nation's defense forces." It also
urged members to remind Congress of the National Guard's
vital role in federal and state missions as well as "...the
role the National Guard plays in generating political
consensus and community support for national defense." 74
Although it is difficult to assess the impact the National
Guard Association had on last year's decision, as one Senate
staffer commented, "When the state's Adjutant General calls
me up, he gets my attention."
In an effort to protect constituent interests, 45 members
in the House of Representatives formed the Northeast-Midwest
72Jim Wolffe, "Powell warns of unneeded structure in the reserves,'
Army Times . 7 October 1991, p. 6.
7jGreg Seigle, "Change just hitting reserves," Army Times , 10
February 1992, p. 13.
74The National Guard Association of the United States, Action Gram-
Request for Action in Opposing Force Structure Cuts , 17 April 1991,
pp. 1-3.
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Congressional coalition to protest the rapid draw-down of the
reserves. The 45 members, representing 18 states, argued
that the Pentagon's proposal disproportionately targeted ARNG
units in their states. Under the Pentagon's plan, 64 percent
of the losses would have come from the Northeastern and
Midwestern states as opposed to 36.5 percent from the South
and West. According to the members of the caucus, the
Pentagon proposal was unfair because only 35 percent of the
ARNG is located in the Northeast and Midwest compared to 65
percent in the South and West."-' Representative Bernard Dwyer
(D-NJ)
, noted that the Pentagon's plan sought a 4400 ARNG
personnel cut in his state, which amounted to a 31 percent
reduction in the New Jersey National Guard for fiscal year
1992. Dwyer asked Pentagon officials if New Jersey was being
targeted to accept an inequitable share of the cuts
nationwide. DOD officials countered the claims and said the
cuts were based on units that were longer needed and not on a
regional basis. 76
In another showing of strong support for the reserves, in
mid-1989 several Senators formed the Senate National Guard
Caucus, a bipartisan group which focuses attention on issues
of importance to the National Guard. According to Senator
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) the primary focus of the caucus in
76Rick Maze, "Coalition lobbies to spare reserves," Army Times , 15
July 1991, p. 7.
''^Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1992 Part 4 , 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 25 Apr
1991, pp. 412-413.
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1991 was to ensure that the " . . .National Guard should not be
disadvantaged as we downsize the military." 7 ' It should be
noted that one of the two Army National Guard divisions
nominated for deactivation last year was from New Jersey. 78
In addition to the caucuses formed in the House and
Senate, several prominent congressional leaders voiced their
support for the reserves. Representative Jamie L. Whitten
(D-MS), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
stated, "If you are going to get local support, you must
maintain the Guard and Reserve." In response to the
President's reserve reduction proposal, Whitten countered,
"If you can't have all the regulars that you would like to
have, you better get somebody who contributes to the economy
and practices on the weekends." '
Another strong supporter of the reserves is Representative
John P. Murtha (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Murtha, a retired
Marine Corps reservist, was instrumental in lessening the
blow on the number of reservists cut last year. In a rather
honest statement, Murtha claimed:
''Senator Frank Lautenberg, Congressional Record , 15 October 1991,
P.S14715.
c Seigle, "Change just hitting reserves," p. 13.
"'"
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1992 Part 4 , pp. 376-377
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Not trying to be parochial ... approximately 43,000 cuts
over several years would come from areas of this
Subcommittee's members ... Politically I don't think it
will work. I don't think there is any way we could pass
a bill where the cuts start to come into effect right
before the next election. 80
When comparing cuts in the AC with reductions in the RC
,
Murtha added:
But Reserve and Guard, they stay in one area and they
vote. Each one of them has families who vote. You lose




Murtha was not satisfied with the administration's
justification behind the reserve proposal nor its methodology
for determining what reserve units were to be cut. Murtha
asserted that before Congress would approve substantial
reductions in the reserves, the Defense Department would have
to produce a detailed plan first. 82 The politically well-
connected Reserve Officer's Association thanked Murtha for
his "legislative assistance to the Guard and Reserve," when
they presented him with the organization's Minuteman of the
Year award for 1991. 8 -
80 Ibid., p. 16.
81 Ibid., p. 26.
82 Pat Towel 1, "Defense Spending Bill Follows Authorization Measure's
Lead," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , 16 November 1991, p3396.
8jRick Maze, "Expanded role envisioned," Army Times , 3 February
1992, p. 10.
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C . POLICY NOT PORK
Although several congressional members cited the negative
economic impact of closing armories in their districts as
rationale for restraining large reserve reductions, several
influential Congressman based their support for the reserves
on policy considerations rather than pork. Some members of
Congress argued that reserve forces provide a cost-effective
alternative to the high cost of maintaining large active
forces. According to the Total Force Policy Report, reserve
units cost about one fourth that of a comparable active unit.
Some members bolstered their argument by noting that
historically the United States has looked to large numbers of
citizen-soldiers to augment a small standing army. Other
congressional leaders noted that the performance of reserve
forces in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the importance of
these forces in the Total Force structure. Several members
claimed that the successful call up the reserves during the
Persian Gulf War finally brought the nation's people into the
war and proved the value of part-time soldiers. Whatever the
argument, when last year's battle over the reserves ended and
the smoke cleared, the Congress succeeded in passing
legislation which kept the reserve forces fairly intact.
D. LAST YEAR'S PROCESS
There were several interesting twists in the congressional
process during last year's battle over the reserves.
Although rejecting the president's proposal, the Senate's
Authorization and Appropriations Committees' proposals were
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consistent. The Senate authorization bill cut reserve
strengths by 33,000 while the appropriations bill cut by
35, 000. 84 The House of Representatives, on the other hand,
acted more parochially, as James Lindsay would have
predicted
.
According to Lindsay, "House members represent smaller and
more homogeneous constituencies, so they generally feel more
pressure to defend the economic interests of their
constituents."- Since the proposed reserve reductions would
have had significant economic consequences in dozens of
congressional districts, it is not surprising that the House
of Representatives reacted differently than the Senate.
While the House authorization bill approved a reserve cut of
38,000, which was slightly higher than its Senate
counterpart, the House appropriations bill mandated a radical
increase in the fiscal 1991 reserve levels by 1,100. This
bold proposal added more controversy to the subject of how
fast, and even whether reserve forces should be reduced.
Towards the end of last year, an unusual twist on the
reserve issue occurred between the authorization conference
agreement and the appropriations conference agreement. On 23
November 1991, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Daniel K.
Inouye (D-HI), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, presented the "Department of Defense
84Conaressional Quarterly Weekly Report , 7 December 1991, p3597
85Lindsay
, p . 92
.
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Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1992- Conference Report."
Inouye noted that the reserve issue was "one of the most
difficult issues that we confronted in conference." 86
Inouye commented that the authorization conference
agreement placed a ceiling on the number of reservists but
amazingly failed to establish a floor. Inouye stressed,
"Nothing- I repeat nothing- is contained in the authorization
conference agreement which would prevent the Department of
Defense from drawing Army Guard end strength down to any
figure it chooses." Inouye added that the appropriations
conference agreement came to the Guard's rescue and set a
floor to prevent the Defense Department from stripping the
reserves. While the appropriations conference rejected the
President's proposal to cut 107,526 reservists, they agreed
to reduce the reserves by 40,030. However, the conference
agreement did offer the Department of Defense a compromise by
permitting the Secretary of Defense to further reduce reserve
end strengths by no more than two percent. Senator Inouye
justified the decisions of the conference based on the
Defense Department's failure to present "...a coordinated
plan to make these reductions." 87
The conference report also directed the Department of
Defense to submit "...a listing of all units scheduled to be
reduced, realigned or inactivated. .. [and] where appropriate,




the lists are to include active units which these Guard and
Reserve units support." Inouye concluded his remarks about
the reserves by saying:
I know that there are Senators who will disagree with
the position the conferees have taken on the Guard and
Reserves. Nonetheless, I stand before you and the
Senate, and I say without reservation- we protected the
Guard. 88
Based on the outcome of last year's reserve debate, it is
fair to conclude that the Department of Defense should
shoulder a good portion of the blame for the defeat it
suffered. The Senate Armed Services Committee criticized the
Pentagon for adopting a "share-the-pain" philosophy rather
than offering a detailed analysis for the cuts. The
committee cited a Navy proposal to deactivate two reserve
mine-sweeping squadrons as evidence of the Pentagon's lack of
a detailed plan to trim the reserves. The committee stated
the Navy proposal "...is completely at odds with the damaging
and embarrassing problems that mines cause the Navy in the
Persian Gulf War."*' 1 The administration underestimated the
strong congressional support for the reserves and failed to
put forth a convincing argument to justify the reserve cuts.
There is little evidence which refutes the claim that the
administration simply put forth a weak and unconvincing
argument. Members of Congress skillfully used this failure
a8 lbid.
89Rick Maze, "Reserve cuts postponed pending study," Army Times , 19
August 1991, p. 6.
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to their advantage and avoided, or at least postponed, the
rather difficult decision to reduce the politically well-
connected reserves.
E. THIS YEAR'S BATTLE
Although the administration was not pleased with last
year's congressional decision to protect the reserves, they
vowed to continue to fight. During this year's budget
process, the administration once again has made an assault on
the reserves. It also appears that reserve supporters remain
determined "not to let the Guard down." Senator Inouye
predicted that the proposed reserve reductions will be the
"...most contentious and most controversial issue" during
this year's budget debates.
'
The day following President Bush's "State of the Union
Address," in a DOD Budget Briefing, Secretary Cheney was
asked if he had any new argument to convince Congress to cut
reserves. Cheney used the base closing process as an analogy
to answer the question. Cheney commented that when he became
Secretary of Defense, he was constantly reminded that it
would be impossible to close bases. He added, that after
much debate, and the eventual establishment of the Base
Closing Commission, a compromise was reached on the
controversial issue and the Department of Defense began
closing bases. Cheney reflected the administration's
determination to reduce the reserve structure when he stated,
^Senator Inouye as quoted by William Matthews in "Guard builds Hill
support," Army Times
. 20 April 1992, p. 18.
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"So I guess you'd have to say I'm an eternal optimist when I
think we'll get the Congress to agree to further cuts in the
Guard and Reserve Structure." 91 General Powell reiterated the
administration's stance when he stated:
As [active-duty] units go out of the force, reserve
units must also go out of the force. It makes no sense
to inactivate units and not inactivate the reserve units
that support them. 92
During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing held on
27 February 1992, Senator John Glenn (D-OH) , warned General
Sullivan, "We need some information to go on as to what the
mix is going to be. Or, I'm afraid what you're going to wind
up with is the shallow glide slope again this year for lack
of having any better information to justify bigger cuts." 93
General Sullivan noted that in addition to the Pentagon's
recommendations for reserve reductions, the RAND Corporation,
as required by Section 402 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992, has been
assigned the task of assessing alternative structures and
mixes of active and reserve forces. RAND submitted an
interim report on 15 May 1992 and will issue its final report
on 15 December 1992. The Secretary of Defense's and the
91 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, "DOD Budget Briefing with
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood,
and Chairman Colin Powell, Chairman JCS," News Briefing released by
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 29
January 1992, p. 15.
92General Colin Powell as quoted by Greg Seigle in, "Change just
hitting reserves," p. 13.
93Senator John Glenn during Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing,
Televised by CSPAN, 27 February 1992.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's evaluation of the
final report is not due until 15 February 1992. 94 It is
interesting to note that RAND ' s final report will
conveniently be completed following this year's November
elections
.
Representative Montgomery launched his 1992 campaign in
support of the reserves before the budget battle began.
Prior to the President's "State of the Union Address" and the
administration's budget proposal, Montgomery issued a "white
paper" advocating for greater reliance on the National Guard
and the reserves. In the paper, Montgomery cites the
nation's historical reliance on the reserves, the non-federal
roles of the Guard, the reserves' success in Desert Storm,
and the economical advantage of the reserves over active-duty
forces, to support his argument. Montgomery concludes by
saying
:
We must be careful not to eliminate units which we may
need in the future. Once they are gone we will not be
able to reconstitute them easily. The bottom line on the
Guard and Reserve reductions is go slow. 95
Representative Murtha also joined Montgomery in this
year's reserve debate. In a speech delivered to the Reserve
Officer's Association, Murtha proposed several changes to the
roles and missions of the reserves. He urged the
94
"Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve
Forces: Interim Report to the Secretary of Defense," RAND, May 1992,
Preface. Hereafter referred to as "RAND Interim Report."
^-Representat ive G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, "White Paper- A New
Perspective On The Total Force: Greater Reliance On The National Guard
and Reserves," 24 January 1992, p. 4.
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implementation of a Joint Staff directorate that would
address reserve affairs in hopes of giving the reserves more
leverage within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Murtha also
proposed using deployed reservists to replace active-duty
soldiers serving overseas. For example, he favors reducing
active forces in Europe even further and rotating National
Guard and reserve units every two months. Murtha also
predicted that, "I can foresee a smaller [active] force with
a lot more missions going to the reserve." 96
Representative Norm Dicks (D-WA) , who supported last
year's administration proposal, predicted, "Congress would
approve deeper Guard and reserve reductions in future years
only if it can insulate the process from constituent pressure
to save local jobs." 97 Dicks also predicted, "We're going to
have another commission." 98 Representative Murtha summed up
the dilemma faced by Congress over the reserves when he
remarked:
We need a practical compromise on this Reserve and Guard
issue with the active forces. We can talk about it in
the abstract all we want to, but we have to have
something we can sell just like any other program.-'
^Representative John Murtha as quoted by Rick Maze in, "Expanded
role envisioned," p. 10.
^Representative Norm Dicks as quoted by Pat Towell in, "Defense
Spending Bill Follows Authorization Measure's Lead," p. 3396.
98 Ibid., p. 3396.
9department of Defense Appropriations for 1992 Part 4
, p . 2 5
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This year's debate made the front page of The New York
Times after General Powell and Secretary Cheney spoke at a
news conference on 26 March 92 and released the Pentagon's
proposed list of 830 ARNG and USAR units it intends to close
by the end of 1993. The DOD, "challenging one of Congress's
political sacred cows," recommended eliminating 140,000
reservists over the next two years. 100 The DOD ' s rationale
for the reductions addressed many of the same issues as last
year's debate. However, it was the first time the DOD
identified the specific units directly associated with the
draw-down. Secretary Cheney claimed that eighty percent of
the reserve reductions were designated:
. . .to go to Europe in wartime and support the active
force. Those active units are out. Now we've identified
the reserve components that support them, and we're
recommending they come out as well. 101
He added that the other 20 percent of the proposed
reductions "...had specific missions that related to that old
Cold War scenario and no longer are required." 102
As expected, the announcement was not well received by
reserve supporters or in Congress. Several prominent members
of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, expressed their
dissatisfaction with the proposal and voiced their support
100Eric Schunitt, "Pentagon Seeking 140,000 Reduction in Reserve
Forces," The New York Times , 27 March 1992, p.l.
101Richard Cheney, "Briefing on Reserve Forces Downsizing", Office




for the reserves. 103 The director of the Reserve Officer's
Association remarked that although he anticipated the
announced reductions, his organization "...was distressed at
the magnitude of the cuts." 104
The National Guard Association dissatisfied with the
Defense Department's proposal attempted "...to outflank the
Pentagon's entrenched defenses by supplying ammunition- in
the form of a detailed alternative force structure- to an
Army of lawmakers who will decide their future." The
National Guard Association's proposal calls for a force
structure of ten active divisions and ten reserve divisions
compared to the administration's Base Force of 12 active, six
reserve, and two cadre divisions. Senator Inouye and Senator
Dale Bumpers (D-AR), both members of the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, claimed they favored
the association's proposal. Senator Bumpers remarked, "The
more I think about 10 and 10, the more it makes sense." 105
Undoubtedly, the Defense Department will continue to face
strong congressional opposition to reducing the number of
reservists or diminishing the role of the reserves in the new
strategy. In an Army Times interview, General Powell
expressed his optimism that Congress will eventually reduce
10
-
<William Matthews, "Guard builds Hill support," Army Times , 20
April 1992, p. 18.
104Seigle, "Total Force tug of war," p.
3
105Greg Seigle, "Alternative Guard plan keeps strength," Army Times
6 April 1992, p. 14.
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the reserve structure. Powell commented that once the 535
members of Congress "come down from the rafters" following
the March 26 announcement they will "...realize that the
problem before the nation is to cut the defense budget in a
sensible way." He also predicted that Congress would
"
. . .start to see some understanding. Something has to
happen. " 106
F . CONCLUSION
Over the next several years the United States will
continue to draw-down and restructure its forces. In an era
of strict fiscal considerations and in an uncertain national
security environment, congressional activism will play a
major role in determining which path the United States will
take concerning defense issues. The issue of the reserve
forces will continue to be a controversial subject. During
last year's debate, both sides presented their arguments, but
in the end, the Congress rejected the administration's
attempt to cut large numbers of reserves.
The administration's stance on the reserves focused on two
arguments. Its major argument was that the reserve structure
was too large and should be cut proportionally to active
units. The second argument was that the reserves will play
less of a role in the new national military strategy which
envisions future conflicts requiring rapidly deployable
contingency forces. Congressional leaders balked at these
106General Colin Powell, "Seeing light at the end of the tunnel," an
interview with Grant Willis in Army Times , 13 April 1992, p. 18.
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arguments and mandated that the DOD produce a comprehensive
list of reserve units to be cut and a justification behind
them before Congress would consider large scale reserve
reductions
.
Driven by "pork instincts," members of Congress rejected
the administration's proposal and approved only a fraction of
the proposed reductions. In an effort to preserve
constituent jobs and avoid the political consequences of
opposing the powerful National Guard and Reserve lobbies, the
Congress, as an institution acted parochially on the reserve
issue
.
This year's reserve debate appears to be heading toward
the same conclusion as last year's. Cuts will be made in the
reserve structure but not on the scale proposed by the
administration. Congressional leaders are anxiously awaiting
the results of the RAND study of the Active/Reserve mix
"...in order to be able to make informed judgements." 10 On
the other hand, it is likely that the administration and DOD
officials are hoping that the RAND study will have the same
effect on the reserve issue as the Base Closing Commission
had on the contentious issue of closing bases.
107Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Record , 14 May 1992, p.S6717
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VI. BASE FORCE II?
Since the Bush Administration proposed the new national
security strategy and the Base Force, the world has witnessed
some dramatic events. America's stunning victory over Iraq
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has caused numerous
congressional leaders to push for substantially greater
reductions in defense spending. Representative Aspin has
taken the lead in this year's budget debate with his proposal
to reduce the force structure by about 33 percent by 1997.
Under Representative Aspin ' s Option C proposal (he has four
different proposals), active divisions would change from 12
(under the current Base Force proposal) to nine, reserve
divisions would remain at six, and the cadre divisions would
be eliminated. 108 For the purposes of this discussion,
Representative Aspin ' s Option C proposal will be used as a
basis for arriving at Base Force II.
If the administration fails in its effort to preserve the
Base Force and is forced to adopt Base Force II, what
recommendations will the Army make concerning further
reductions in its force structure? How will these reductions
affect the Army's role in the new strategy? What impacts
will these reductions have on the Army's reserve components?
Faced with the difficult task of determining which division
108Maze, "Congress whacks away at force plan," p.
4
flags to take down, the Army must look to the new national
security strategy to determine the appropriate force
structure to meet the nation's security needs. The answers
to the questions posed above will be viewed in terms of the
four major principles of the new national security strategy:




Since deterrence is often thought in terms of nuclear
weapons at the strategic level, and since the Army plays a
minimal role in America's triad, the Army's contribution to
the deterrent aspect of the new strategy must be viewed in
terms of conventional deterrence. 109 Additionally, as the
United States and the former Soviet Union continue to
dismantle their nuclear arsenals at unprecedented rates,
conventional deterrence will rise in importance as a means of
convincing "...a potential adversary that the cost of
aggression, at any level exceeds any possibility of gain." 110
As the military's budget continues to shrink and the
number of divisions is reduced, America's conventional
deterrent potential will also shrink. According to
Representative Aspin's latest proposal, the AC would be cut
109The Army will be responsible for the land based interceptors and
systems of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
program.
110James J. Tritten, America Promise to Come Back: Our New National
Security Strategy . Naval Postgraduate School Document NPS-NS-91-003C, 23
October 1991, p. 18.
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even more drastically, while the RC remain intact.
Representative Aspin appears to be embracing the proposals of
several Congressmen and reserve proponents to shift more
emphasis and missions to the cost effective RC . In terms of
conventional deterrence, as the United States eliminates more
AC divisions or realigns them into the RC, the credibility
and capability aspects of deterrence will be undermined.
Unless the political leadership of the country displays the
determination to call-up reservists in the initial stage of a
crisis, adversaries may view this realignment as a weakening
of America's ability to quickly and adequately respond to a
crisis. In other words, U.S. official must prevent an
adversary from being tempted to pursue a military option
because they believe the gains will more than offset the
costs. A country must be convinced that it cannot achieve
its aims before the United States can effectively react.
In view of the potential of further undermining the
conventional deterrent role of the Army, the Army's
leadership will strongly oppose a Base Force II proposal
which advocates decreasing active forces or realigning active
units into the reserves. The Army will argue that by cutting
the current Base Force even further, the nation runs the risk
of "of not having decisive victory." Also, as General
Sullivan recently testified, "That would require large-scale
mobilization, " and thus an inability to rapidly respond to a
crisis situation with sufficient forces. 111
inMaze, "Congress whacks away at force plan," p. 4.
60
If the United States expects to maintain a credible
conventional deterrent, while it dismantles Army divisions,
it must improve its capability and credibility to respond to
no-notice future conflicts more rapidly and with sufficient
combat power. This leads into a discussion of the second and
third aspects of the new strategy: forward presence and
crisis response.
B . FORWARD PRESENCE
At the present time, the United States Army is continuing
its rapid draw-down of forces in Germany. By 1995, two full
divisions will have been eliminated from Germany, jokingly
referred to as DEFORGER. If the Army is forced to bring down
three more active divisions by 1997, it will more than likely
recommend the removal of another division from Germany.
Currently, the DOD is clinging to the argument that a corps
in Germany is still appropriate given the current instability
and turmoil in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe,
most notably the crisis in the Balkans. However, if by 1995,
the economic and political situation in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union stabilizes and domestic political
pressure in the United States demands the return of more
forces, the DOD may be forced to withdraw another division
and leave a small military contingent in Germany. This force
would probably include a large staff, enough personnel to
maintain POMCUS sites, and a combat brigade. Whatever the
size, the remaining forces in Germany will merely symbolize
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America's resolve to retain a foothold in European affairs as
well as calming any fears of a resurgent Germany.
Another option for the Army is to pull out its division in
South Korea or substantially reduce its size. However, this
move will depend on several factors. Currently the Army is
reducing the number of troops in Korea by 3,000. The pull
out of another 6,000 soldiers is dependent upon North Korean
compliance with nuclear weapons treaties and on site
inspections of nuclear facilities. 11 - It is likely that the
U.S. will withdraw all its forces from South Korea if the two
Koreas reunify.
These cutbacks will reduce the Army's commitment to the
forward presence role in the new strategy to two or three
divisions: a heavy brigade or division in Germany, an
infantry division (minus) in Korea, and a light infantry
division in Hawaii. Since the reserve contribution to the
forward deployed units in the forward presence mission is
minimal, these moves will have little effect on the reserves.
In terms of quick response contingency operations, the
Army will fight a long and tough battle before yielding to
any reductions in the divisions assigned to the rapidly
deployable category of the CONUS based contingency force.
These units are the heart and soul of the Army's contribution
to the forward presence element of the new strategy. Any
reductions in these forces would mean a total abandonment of
^-Bernard Adelsberger , "Army takes fast track to contingency
force," Army Times
. 10 February 1992, p. 6.
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the new strategy. In fact, the Army will more than likely
continue to demand for more resources allocated to these
divisions, including more Navy and Air Force emphasis on
providing airlift and sealift assets to effectively and
efficiently deploy these forces.
If the current Base Force does not draw the Army and the
Marine Corps closer together, Base Force II will likely force
the two services to work together. Under current plans, the
Marine Corps will be reduced to 159,100 active personnel and
35,000 reservists by 1997. After the restructuring is
complete, the Marine Corps will be comprised of two combat-
ready divisions, each with a strength of 14,000, and a third
division manned by 7,000 marines, which will be augmented by
reservists following mobilization. 113 It would be a mistake
for Army planners to ignore the two combat-ready marine
divisions when planning for quick response contingency
operations. The Army divisions in the Contingency Force,
coupled with one or two Marine divisions, provides for a
lethal and versatile combination.
It appears that in the era of Goldwater-Nichols and
jointness, the Congress is determined to press for more joint
endeavors in an effort to reduce duplications and save money.
For instance, the topic of replacing Marine Corps armor units
with Army tank units was raised during the appearance of the
the four service chiefs before the Senate Armed Service
lljJames Longo, "Th<= smaller Corps: Too many missions; too few
Marines," Navy Times , February 1992, pp. 12-14.
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Committee Hearing in February 1992. In an era of fiscal
constraints and rapidly declining defense budgets, it will be
in the best interests of all the services to adopt a "we can
hang together or we can hang separately" mentality.
C . CRISIS RESPONSE
Given that the Army eliminates one division in Germany,
refuses to cut any of the rapidly deployable contingency
forces, and Congress refuses to compromise over reducing any
reserve divisions, the Army will have to trim two active
divisions from the reinforcing category under the crisis
response pillar. These reductions will leave one heavy
active division with a roundout brigade, four reserve
separate infantry brigades, and six reserve divisions in the
reinforcing category. As is evident, the RC will make up an
overwhelming majority of the reinforcing element of the
contingency force under Base Force II.
If Base Force II becomes a reality, it is probable that
the suggestion of rounding out more units at the company or
battalion level in the AC will be raised. Given the roundout
experience from the Persian Gulf War, it is unlikely that the
Army will embrace such a proposal. The National Guard
intensely dislikes the proposed idea as well. The current
Army's leadership is adamant about maintaining the current
combat capabilities of its divisions and will fight any
proposal that they perceive as leading to "a hollow Army."
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D. RECONSTITUTION
The fourth aspect of the new national security strategy is
reconstitution. As previously mentioned, Base Force II calls
for an elimination of the cadre division concept, which in
turn spells out the abandonment of part of the Army's role in
reconstitution. In other words, if the United States adopts
Base Force II and a major war arises, the Armed Forces will
have no alternative but to resort to a large scale
mobilization and conscription to reconstitute its forces.
E. SELF-DETERRENCE
The calling-up of reserves is a political statement. Since
World War II, there has been a trend which indicates domestic
politics have a significant impact on the decision to use
reserve forces. Additionally, when reserves have been
mobilized, domestic politics intervened in the selection of
units to be mobilized as well as the timing of their
mobilization. 114 Before mobilizing the reserves,
" [p] residents must consider not only the escalatory effects
in the international community, but also the domestic
political reaction, including additional pressures during
unfolding crises to invoke the War Powers Act, which
presidents have consistently sought to avoid." 115
114Martin Binkin and William Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard and Reserve
Rhetoric, Realities, and Risk
,
(Washington, D.C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1989), p. 62.
11BIbid., p. 109.
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Under Base Force II, the president may face a crisis
situation which could be intense enough to be beyond the
capabilities of the small active forces. As detailed
earlier, it is highly likely that large numbers of reserves
will be necessary to augment active forces in a Base Force II
crisis scenario. With fewer active forces and an increased
reliance on reserve forces, the presidential flexibility to
commit forces without congressional approval, which has been
exercised so frequently in the past, will become more
constrained. The possibility exists that the political mood
of the country may prevent or postpone a large call up
reserves. The United States might find itself in a
predicament of self -deterrence . The political leadership may
yield to the domestic pressures and "sit this one out."
If the President deems it necessary, he may be forced to
immediately request congressional approval to activate
reservists well beyond his current ability to call-up 200,000
reserves for 90 days without declaring a national emergency.
This call-up, commonly referred as the "200-K call-up," seeks
"
. . . to meet operational requirements, subject to
congressional reporting within 24 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the call-up and anticipated use of the forces." 116
Following the Persian Gulf War, the GAO conducted a study on
reserve mobilization and recommended that Congress examine
116U.S. General Accounting Office, "DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning
Roles Under the Total Force Policy , " Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, December 1989), p. 42.
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the intent behind the "200-K call-up" and its restrictions
and "...clarify whether this intent remains valid in light of
the experiences of the Gulf War." 117 The hesitation to call
up combat reserve units during the Persian Gulf added to the
already "...deep concern about the wisdom of adopting a
military strategy that depends, in the final analysis, on a
presidential decision to mobilize reserve forces." 118 This
topic is likely to generate a great deal of discussion
between the executive branch who favors more latitude and
those in the legislative branch who are concerned about
excessive presidential power.
E . IMPLICATIONS
The implementation of Base Force II will have significant
implications for the RC . It is likely that the Army will
become more reliant on the reserves to perform even more
missions. To determine the effects of Base Force II on the
reserves, it is useful to address the levels of warfare and
how the reserves fit into them. The three levels of warfare
include tactical, operational, and strategic.
As is the case with the current Base Force, under Base
Force II, the United States will probably still have the
capability to "...take unilateral conventional force military
actions at the tactical-level [like Grenada or Panama], but
probably not at the strategic- [like World War II] or
117
"Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active and Reserve Support Forces," p. 29.




levels [like Desert Storm] of air/land
warfare." 119 Under the current Base Force, it is assumed that
the United States would be able to respond unilaterally to
one and a half contingencies at the tactical level. Under
Base Force II, the AC units in the Contingency Force can be
expected to successfully perform a tactical operation similar
to a Panama with minimal reserve participation. However, the
U.S. may find itself unable to respond simultaneously to a
half contingency mission without calling up additional
reserve units including ground combat units.
At the operational level, with the current Base Force, one
military analyst contends, "It should be assumed that the
U.S. could not unilaterally mount an opposed contingency
operation or campaign such as Desert Shield." 1 - 1 ' Under Base
Force II, it is even more unlikely that the U.S. would be
able carry out such an operation unless significant numbers
of reserves, including combat units are mobilized. Assuming
that host nation support is available and the United States
is part of a coalition, it will still be necessary to call up
the bulk of the RC designated for the reinforcing mission.
Finally, at the strategic level of warfare, the United
States will have no option but to turn to total mobilization
and conscription to generate enough forces necessary for a
large scale war, given a two year warning time as stated in
the new strategy. Obviously, reserve units will play a major
119Tritten, p. 3 5
120 Ibid.
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role at this level as they have traditionally done in the
past. All elements of the reserve structure will be
mobilized including individual ready reservists, inactive
reservists, and retired active duty and reservists.
Faced with a scenario similar to the recent Persian Gulf
conflict, the political leadership will have no alternative
but to immediately call up the reserves including reserve
ground combat units. It is not prudent to assume that the
next conflict will afford the political leadership the luxury
of watching the situation develop for several weeks before
making the decision to mobilize significant numbers or
reserves. Currently, the Army contends that it will take a
roundout brigade at least 90 days (one year for a reserve or
ARNG Division) following mobilization, to train and prepare
for implementation into direct combat. Thus, the survival of
those combat forces in the rapidly deployable component of
the CONUS based contingency force may depend on those reserve
divisions performing the reinforcing role. The failure or
hesitation, on the part of the political leadership to call
up reserve ground combat units, could present severe problems
for those active combat forces initially deployed to a crisis
area. As two senior retired military officers note, "Few
realize how totally integrated the force has become and how
little capability to sustain land warfare would exist were
mobilization of the Reserve and National Guard not to
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occur." 121 This assertion will become even more profound if
Base Force II is adopted.
1 - 1Frederic J. Brown and Aubrey R. Merrill, "Challenges of U.S. Army
Reserve Force Readiness," The U.S. Army in a New Security Era , ed . Sam




Over the past three years the world has witnessed a
tremendous transformation in the international system.
According to one political scientist, "The world has changed
more rapidly in the past three years than any other time
since 1945. ,,:L -- President Bush, as well as numerous political
scientists, have often referred to the current international
system as the "New World Order."
The changes in the international system began with the
toppling of communist controlled governments throughout
Eastern Europe. The opening of the Berlin Wall in November
1989 and the reunification of Germany marked a significant
turning point in the Cold War. In just one year after the
opening of the Berlin Wall, one of the icons which symbolized
the Cold War, a divided Germany, disappeared.
Another critical event which has had a major impact on the
international system was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990. President Bush viewed the brutal Iraqi invasion
and annexation of Kuwait as the first true test of the New
World Order. The multinational condemnation of Iraqi
aggression, the creation of a coalition opposed to the
occupation of Kuwait, and the use of armed force backed by
1JJJoseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order," Foreign Affairs
Spring 1992, p. 83.
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United Nations resolutions represented a substantial
departure from the lack of international cohesiveness typical
of the Cold War.
The events in Eastern Europe and Germany marked the
beginning of what would eventually result in the most
significant change over the past three years: the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the the closing of the final chapter
of the Cold War. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union
"...caused the end of the bipolar order that had persisted
for nearly half a century...." and radically transformed the
entire international system. 123
Today, in the context of the remarkable events over the
past three years, military officials and political leaders
are engaged in a contentious debate over restructuring our
armed forces. This debate is not a new one. These topics
have been points of contention throughout our history. In
addition to budgetary limitations, topics such as the
appropriate mix and structure, as well as future roles and
missions of active and reserve forces will dominate
discussions in military and political circles in the months
ahead. This chapter will offer recommendations for altering
the roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve
the effectiveness of the Total Army.
123 Ibid., p. 84.
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A. INCREASE SUPPORT ROLE AND REDUCE COMBAT ROLE
As the restructuring debate continues, it is important to
consider maximizing each component's strengths and minimizing
their weaknesses. One military analyst summarized the
strengths and weaknesses in the following manner:
The Active Component is best suited to conduct combat
operations, particularly the contingency type we expect
in the future; the Reserve Components are best at
providing combat support and combat service support. 124
When discussing the reserves, Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are quick to point out that certain skills are better
suited for placement in the RC than in the AC. On numerous
occasions, they commented on the impressive Persian Gulf War
performance of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units
who have pilots who fly airplanes on their everyday jobs.
During a briefing on reserve forces downsizing, Secretary
Cheney described what capabilities should be kept in the
reserves
:
Medical units, mortuary units, stevedore units,
transportation units, ammunition hauling units, where you
only need that function performed when you're in an
ongoing combat operation, put that capability in the
reserves. You have enough time to call it up. It doesn't
require the same kind of training as a combined arms unit
does, and it's a better candidate to be in the
reserves . 125
The Persian Gulf War highlighted the RC strength in the
support role. Virtually all after action reports praised the
124 Philip A. Brehm, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to the Total
Force," (Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College), 21 February
1992, p.l.
1J
-'Richard Cheney, "Briefing on Reserve Forces Downsizing," p. 5.
73
performance of reserve support units. As noted in several
reports, there were some reserve CS and CSS units that were
better prepared and outperformed similar active units.
Reserve units that have transf errable civilian skills were
singled out as being particularly effective. 126
In light of the experiences from the Persian Gulf War, the
Army should consider taking advantage of the reserve strength
in the support role and realign and assign, where possible,
more CS and CSS units in the RC . As recently brought out in
a GAO report, the Army, during the Persian Gulf War,
experienced difficulties in providing sufficient active and
reserve support forces. The GAO concluded that although the
Army was able to provide most of the support necessary,
initially it was unable to provide some critically needed
skills because personnel with those skills were members of
reserve units and the call-up was not implemented yet. The
report also claimed, "Over the course of the war, it [Army]
sent virtually all of some types of forces, leaving few, if
any, to reinforce operations had the war lasted longer or a
second conflict arisen." 127 One solution to remedy this
shortcoming is to realign or restructure the combat structure
in the RC divisions assigned to the continental U.S. based
reinforcement forces into more support units.
1J/
"Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve
126Heller, p. 23.
27
Support Forces," pp. 4-5.
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The issue of reserve ground combat forces invariably
brings up the discussion of the roundout and roundup units.
In the CRS Report, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the
Persian Gulf War," the author, Robert Goldich, examines
several "radical changes" to the roundout concept in addition
to the Army's initiatives implemented following the war.
These changes include rounding out at smaller units such as
company or battalion level, rounding up at the company or
battalion level, filling key command and staff positions in
roundout units with active army officers and noncommissioned
officers, reducing or eliminating the ARNG role in roundout,
getting rid of roundout, and finally keeping roundout but
fixing it. Goldich does a superb job of capturing the
essence of both sides of the argument for each proposal.
However, Goldich does not consider the possibility of
realigning the missions of roundout and roundup units from a
combat to a combat support or combat service support role.
The time has come for military and civilian leaders to
make a thorough evaluation of the role combat reserve forces
will play in the future. Several analysts contend that
today's battlefield has become too sophisticated and warfare
has become too complex an operation for soldiers who train 38
days a year plus any additional training assemblies. 128 One
of the key principles of the new national military strategy
is to have the capability to rapidly respond to a wide
variety of regional contingencies. Based on General
128Shaver, p. 2.
75
Sullivan's claim that it will take at least 90 days to train
a reserve combat brigade and one year to train a reserve
combat division, the likelihood of reserve combat
participation in the rapid response quick conclusion
contingency operations anticipated in the future is
remote. 129 General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of
the U.S. Forces Command, in testimony before the Defense
Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee on 8 March
1991, captured the essence of why it is more challenging to
keep reserve combat forces at a high readiness posture when
compared to reserve support forces:
...combat support and combat service support units
generally have uncomplicated unit functions, even though
many of their individual skills are complex. . .
.
On the other hand, combat units such as [armored]
cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and
complex synchronization skills at the company level and
higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill
periods. The training of these combat units at company
level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but
those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire
support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer,
signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply,
transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a
whole host of others.
: -
'Based on a briefing given at the Naval Postgraduate School by a
high ranking officer assigned to the J-5 staff. Defense planners do not
expect significant roundout or roundup involvement unless the U.S. finds




They have to synchronize everything that we do on the
battlefield. The tasks and standards associated with
these synchronized skills change at all levels as the
battlefield conditions change. Their execution is more
an art than a science, and they take a considerable
amount of time and effort to master. 130
Before the Army places more reserve participation in the
support role or restructures its reserve combat units, there
are several obstacles which must be breached. First, "...the
Army National Guard must be willing to relinquish its
attachment to combat units." 131 Also, the RC must "...confess
to its ineptitude at large scale combined arms operations at
brigade and higher levels." 132 The ARNG will have to accept
performing more support missions as is the case in the USAR.
As one reserve officer commented, this proposal will likely
encounter strong opposition from the National Guard. He
hal f
-
j okingly remarked, "After all, when you travel
throughout America and you see a statue dedicated to the
citizen-soldier in some small town, he's not driving a truck,
he's holding a rifle." 133
Second, the AC must be genuinely committed to the Total
Force principle of "First to Fight, First to be Equipped."
According to this principle, priority goes to those units
that are designated as early-deploying, regardless of whether
130General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., as quoted in Goldich, p. 43.
131Brehm, p. 2.
132Shaver, p. 2.
ljijlSummary of a statement from a telephonic conversation with a
senior U.S. Army reserve officer at the U.S. Army War College.
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they are in the AC or the RC . In the past, equipping combat
reserve units has worked reasonably well. However,
"...priority for equipping support forces and mobilization
forces has not received equal attention." 134 For years, the
reserves have expressed their concerns about significant
equipment shortages in many of their units. Lack of
equipment and insufficient manning adversely affects
training opportunities, reduces readiness levels, and
decreases mobilization capabilities. Army leaders must
address these issues prior to any restructuring attempts.
Finally, military leaders must have enough confidence in
the capabilities of the RC to recommend to the political
leadership the call-up, without delay, of reserve CS and CSS
units. Hesitation to call-up significant numbers of reserves
in critical specialties will result in a replay of the
problems encountered by the Army during Operations Desert
Shield and Storm. The timely call-up of reserve support
forces, particularly those associated with units earmarked
for the rapidly deployable mission of the forward presence
pillar, will be critical to the success of U.S. forces in
future contingency operations.
In his essay, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total
Force," Colonel Philip A. Brehm quotes an excerpt from
President Bush's Aspen Institute address in which the
134Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1991: Report of the
Reserve Forces Policy Board
,
(Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing
Office, December 1989), p.xix.
President announced a new military policy for the United
States. Brehm places great emphasis on the President's
comment of not merely reducing current force levels but
restructuring them and advocates converting the majority of
reserve combat units to CS and CSS units. Brehm contends:
. . .the Army has failed to implement the guidance
provided by its Commander in Chief at Aspen, Colorado, on
August 2, 1990. The Army's Base Force is indeed nothing
more than a scaled-back or shrunken down version of the
force we presently have, which is exactly what the
President said we must not do. Restructuring will
require abandonment of some "traditional roles or
missions for each component, but it will be what is best
for the nation and the Army. 135
The shifting of emphasis away from the traditional combat
role in the ARNG to a support role meets the President's
intent of restructuring. It also takes advantage of one of
the RC ' s greatest strengths: the ability to provide CS and
CSS.
B. CONSOLIDATE IN THE GUARD AND THE RESERVE
On 12 December 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
announced a plan to merge the USAR into the ARNG, cut their
combined strength by 60,000, and save approximately $150
million a year. In addition to eliminating hundreds of
reserve units, McNamara ' s radical proposal called for the
USAR to consist entirely of individuals not units.
McNamara ' s proposal met with fierce and immediate opposition
from congressional leaders and supporters of the USAR who
'Brehm, pp . 1-2 .
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would stand to lose the most under the merger. 136 Although
McNamara ' s plan was soundly defeated, it is useful to examine
his rationale for this radical departure from the traditional
Army force structure.
Secretary McNamara had three reasons for merging the two
components. First, the units designated to be inactivated
were significantly short of combat manpower and equipment and
would require substantial sums of money to upgrade. Second,
none of the units to be eliminated were in the nation's
contingency plans. Finally, McNamara asserted that the
security environment had changed and "highly efficient,
quick-response units" were more favorable than "large numbers
of untrained men." 137 It is interesting to note that
Secretary Cheney's reasons for reducing the reserves today
are quite similar to Secretary McNamara ' s nearly three
decades ago.
While it is probably not politically realistic to assume
that Congress would accept a similar McNamara-type proposal,
recent motions by key congressional leaders suggest that this
topic should be examined further. Senators Sam Nunn and John
Warner (R-VA) are leading this year's crusade to overhaul
military roles and missions. Their goal is to eliminate
duplication and reshape the military in hopes of reducing
costs while still meeting the threats of the post-Cold War
136A complete discussion of the McNamara proposal can be found in
Mahon, pp. 231-236.
137 Ibid., p. 232.
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era. The two leading members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee suggest there are nine areas where streamlining is




While the details of reorganizing or consolidating the
reserves are beyond the scope of this paper, there are a few
factors to consider before making any decisions. First, the
United States Army is one of the few armies of the world that
has two reserves: the ARNG or militia and the USAR or federal
reserve. By the mere existence of this dual structure, there
is much redundancy and duplication. Second, any proposal
should seek to maximize the strengths of each component:
maneuver combat forces in the active army, CS and CSS in the
USAR, and reinforcement and reconst itution in the ARNG.
National Guard supporters are likely to disagree with this
breakdown. However, the dramatic changes in the
international system over the past three years, which some
political scientists have referred to as a "paradigm shift,"
dictates that military and civilian planners can no longer
afford to think in terms of the "old paradigm." According to
Colonel Charles Heller, U.S. Army Reserve Advisor to the
Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College:
In essence the militia [ARNG] is an eighteenth century
creation, unwieldy in the twentieth, and an anachronism
in the twenty-first century.
1J8Rick Maze, "Role Call: Nunn, Warner push massive service
streamlining," Army Times , 13 July 1992, p. 3.
The federal reserve, the USAR...is a twentieth century
force more suited to the twenty-first century than the
militia. The USAR not only has units, it has the right
units, CS and CSS to marry up with maneuver units of the
AC. 139
Any streamlining proposal must also ensure that each
state has the capability to meet its state's missions,
especially state disaster relief responsibilities. In the
wake of the Pentagon's announcement to eliminate 830 ARNG and
USAR units in all 50 states, there was an outcry by several
congressional leaders who claimed that the proposed cuts
could undermine their state's ability to effectively respond
to civil emergencies
.
14:i In the past, states have relied on
the ARNG to respond to natural and man-made disasters such as
tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, blizzards, forest fires, and
civil disturbances.
Recently, significant numbers of National Guardsmen and
active forces were called upon to restore peace during the
Los Angeles riots in April and May of this year. Six hundred
Nevada National Guard troops were also called-up to provide
the same assistance in May when rioting broke out in Las
Vegas. Captain Vic Dubina, spokesman for the National Guard
Association, remarked that the Los Angeles riots serve as
"...a stark reminder of what we've been saying all along:
139Charles E. Heller, "Economy of Force: A Total Army, The Israel
Defense Force Model," Draft paper written for the Strategic Studies
Institute U.S. Army War College, 21 February 1992, p. 53.
140Eric Schmitt, "Senators Question Proposal to Cut Reserves," The
New York Times , 9 April 1992, p.A14.
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You've got to consider the state mission," before making
large scale reductions in the National Guard. 141
Given the emphasis on reducing defense costs by avoiding
duplication and consolidating where appropriate, the time is
right for military and civilian leaders to reconsider
streamlining the RC . Overhauling the RC and reducing
redundancies throughout the services will produce more
sweeping changes than the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization
Act of 1986 which placed emphasis on "jointness." Although
such a proposal will likely generate stiff opposition from
the ARNG supporters or USAR proponents, depending on who
would stand to lose the most, it is important to recall the
President's intent of restructuring within the armed forces
as envisioned in his Aspen Institute address: to do what is
best for the nation.
141
"Wars," Army Times . 18 May 1992, p. 13
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the
early 1970s, the roles and missions of the reserves have
expanded significantly. It was the intent of the founders of
the policy, "...to maintain as small an active peacetime
force as national security policy, military strategy, and
overseas permit and to integrate the capabilities of the
active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner." 14 - In
implementing the Total Force Policy, the Army assigned many
vital CS and CSS missions to the reserves. The Army
leadership, led by General Abrams firmly believed that by
intertwining the RC with the AC, the political leadership
would have no choice but to call up the reserves. For almost
twenty years, the Army preached about the vital role reserve
units played in the "One Army" philosophy. Some reserve
units, including roundout combat units were expected to
mobilize within a matter of days and deploy 30 or more days
later. It was envisioned that roundout units would eventual
link up with their parent divisions and fight shoulder to
shoulder with active units. No longer were reserves forces
considered to "be held in reserve."
However, the Total Force Policy did not receive its first
true test until Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
14
-"Operat ion Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active and Reserve Support Forces," p. 8.
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The nation witnessed the largest mobilization of the reserves
since World War II. Initially, large numbers of CS and CSS
units were called-up for operational support of a huge
logistics effort. In the early stages of Desert Shield, it
looked as if the true intent of the Total Force Policy would
be carried out: reserve units would fight alongside active
units
.
The performance of reserve CS and CSS units during the
Persian Gulf War appears to have validated the role of the
reserves in the Total Force Policy. 143 Several military
leaders praised these reserve units for their contribution to
the success of the war . However, it was the failure to call
up the roundout brigades of two deploying divisions that
sparked much controversy and raised some serious doubts about
the Army's commitment to the Total Force Policy and the role
of the reserves in the new national security strategy. The
controversy increased following the questionable post-
mobilization performance of three roundout brigades.
The worse fears of reserve supporters were confirmed after
General Sullivan announced the "roundup" program, Operation
Bold Shift, and increased reserve combat unit post-
mobilization training to 90 days. Despite the Army's public
praise for the reserves' performance during the war and
announcements that the roundout concept was here to stay, the
143Two National Guard Field Artillery Brigades deployed to the
Persian Gulf and participated in the ground campaign. Most reports
conclude that these units performed favorably.
85
Army's reserve initiatives seem to indicate that the Army's
leadership is steering away from a force structure heavily
reliant on reserves. The Army appears convinced that reserve
combat maneuver units are incapable of being deployed with
active units unless they undergo thorough post- mobilization
training
.
After President Bush announced his new national security
strategy in August 1990, there was much discussion about the
role of the reserves in the strategy. Based on the
administration's assumption that future conflicts would
require relatively small but rapidly deployable forces, the
Army proposed that the bulk of its units in the contingency
force be made up of active forces. It was the composition of
the contingency force that raised the most concerns among
reserve proponents . Reserve supporters were concerned that
the new strategy would mean less of a role for the reserves
and an abandonment of the Total Force Policy.
At the present time, the Army is facing several
challenges. It is in the process of dismantling a European
structure which had been in place for over forty years. It
is in the process of thinning its ranks by at least 25
percent and possibly more. It is in the process of
restructuring its forces to meet the objectives of the new
strategy. Finally, it is rethinking the proper mix of active
and reserve forces in the new strategy.
Several congressional leaders have made convincing
arguments and proposals which favor a smaller active force
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coupled with a larger cost-effective reserve force. If the
trends in Congress continue and budget resources become more
scarce, the Army may find itself implementing Base Force II.
The role of the reserves, under Base Force II, will become
significantly more important. If a conflict arises, and
reserve forces are mobilized, including combat arms units,
they will fight side be side with active forces. If the Army
is going to meet the objectives of the new strategy under the
current Base Force or Base Force II, it must begin to mend
the differences which currently exists between its three
components: active, National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.
Rather than worrying about reducing interservice rivalry, the
Army must begin to eliminate its intraservice rivalry first.
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